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ANOTHER APPROACH TO REGULATORY REFORM
By Murray L. Weidenbaum
A Statement to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D.C., September 20, 1978
I would like to present a different approach to regulatory reform,
one that involves the Congress more than the bureaucracy.

At the outset,

it is helpful to emphasize the compelling case for reforming government
regulation:
1.

The regulatory apparatus is extremely cumbersome and costly.

To

substantiate that, I submit for the record my formal statement and the
new Directory of Federal Regulation just prepared by our Center for the
Study of American Business at Washington University.
2.

Government regulation generates many adverse side effects which

interfere with the attainment of other important national objectives.
These undesirable impacts of regulation include higher inflation, more
unemployment, lower productivity, reduced capital formation, and a slowdown in technological innovation.
3.

But the primary objection to regulation is that, by and large, it

is not working.

It is not a question of begrudging a few more billion
11

11

dollars for job safety, consumer health, etc. The fact is that the
typical regulatory program is not effective in reaching these worthy
objectives.
The answer surely is not to redouble the existing regulatory effort.
That only resembles the hangover remedy that consists of the hair of the
Note: Mr. Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for the Study of American
Business at Washington University in St. Louis and adjunct scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute.
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dog that bit you.
the bureaucracy.
agencies.

Nor is the main answer the obvious one of berating
To be sure, much nonsense emanates from the regulatory

I have tried to do mY share to expose and thus eliminate silly

regulations.
But the fundamental source of the problem is statutory.

Every regu-

lation is promulgated under the authority of a statute passed by the
Congress.

Every regulator is paid out of an appropriation passed by

the Congress.

As a general matter, Congress has set up too many regulatory

agencies, passed too many regulatory laws, set up too many unrealistic
regulatory objectives, and appropriated too much money to carry on too
much regulation.

Thus, the ultimate need is for the Congress to come

to realize that the government cannot regulate everything.
We must understand why the Congress has set up this vast regulatory
apparatus.

Surely, the intent was not to harass business or to burden

the consumer.

Rather, the Congress was reacting to the pressures from

a variety of interest groups that have been urging more and more regulation, many of them operating under the banner of the Public Interest.
The public, the media, and government decision makers all need to
realize that the limited viewpoints of these so-called public interest
groups prevent them from effectively representing the totality of the
public interest.

The problem is their attitude that they represent the

public interest.

One of the keys to their power is the myth of their

powerlessness.
In the public arena, they possess great power.

Large segments of

the media, as well as many other institutions, defer to the representatives
of the so-called Public Interest Groups because they are viewed automatically
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as the underdog.

This simpleminded attitude often results in the

people who disagree with them being portrayed as the "heavies." Just
because I may disagree with Ralph Nader on a specific issue should not
inevitably be taken as my representing some special interest opposed to
the public welfare.

It may just happen that on occasion Ralph is wrong.

A little humility would go a long way in broadening the intellectual
horizons of many of the so-called Public Interest Groups.

It is no

simple task to identify the public interest in any specific issue of
public policy.

As a past participant in government policy-making, it

is apparent to me that good policy consists of properly balancing and
reconciling a variety of bona fide interests.

This is far more difficult

than merely choosing in a simple-minded fashion between 11 public" or
"consumer" interests (which are presumably good and to be endorsed) and
11

Special" interests, which are presumably evil and to be opposed.
What can be done? There are no simple approaches.

It surely is not

a question of being for or against regulation of business.

A substantial

degree of governmental intervention is to be expected in a complex, modern
society.

The need, rather, is to identify those sensible changes that can

be made in the regulatory process so as to achieve the desired social
goals (less pollution, fewer product hazards, etc.) with minimum adverse
impacts on other important goals (more jobs, less inflation, etc.).

The

serious question is whether, in view of the many goals of our society,
government regulation in a particular instance is doing more harm than good.
1. An economic impact statement should be required prior to issuing
each new regulation.

The notion that policymakers should carefully con-

sider the costs and other adverse effects of their actions as well as
the benefits is neither new nor revolutionary.

The Ford Administration

did institute some form of economic impact statements for new regulations.
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President Carter has recently made some changes in the procedures.
Unfortunately, neither the Ford nor the Carter approaches are up to the
task.
Merely requiring a reluctant agency to perform benefit/cost analyses
is not adequate.

The key action needed is for Congress to pass a law

limiting regulations to those instances where the total benefits to
society exceed the costs.

Government regulation should be carried to

the point where the costs equal the benefits, and no further.

Overregula-

tion -- which is regulation for which the costs exceed the benefits -should be avoided.

The failure to take those costs into account has re-

sulted in the problem of overregulation that faces the United States today.
The

~equirement

for an economic impact statement would be well met

by the provisions of S.2011, the proposed Regulatory Reduction and Control
Act of 1978. This proposed law contains many important and useful provisions, notably requiring the head of each regulatory agency to send to
the Congress a comprehensive economic analysis of a proposed rule before
it takes effect.

Under S.2011 the required economic impact analysis must

cover the costs and benefits to consumers, wage earners, businesses, and
federal, state and local governments.
also required.

A paperwork impact analysis is

It would be helpful if S.2011 required the regulatory

agency to demonstrate that the benefits exceeded the costs before it
could promulgate any new rule.
2.

All existing government regulatory activities should be subject

to a sunset mechanism.

Each regulatory agency should be reviewed by the

Congress on a strict timetable to determine whether it is worthwhile to
continue it in light of changing circumstances. Many government programs,
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prove this.

A more satisfying answer to improving the effectiveness of

government regulation of private activities requires a basic change in
the approach to regulation, and one not limited to the job safety program.
Indeed, I use that program merely as an illustration.

If the objective of

public policy is to reduce accidents, then public policy should focus
directly on the reduction of accidents themselves.
Rather than issuing citations to employers who fail to fill forms out
correctly or who do not post the right notices, emphasis should be placed
on the regulation of employers with high and rising accident rates.

But

the government should not be much concerned with how a company achieves
a safer working environment.

Some companies may find it more efficient

to change work rules, others to buy new equipment, and still others to
retrain workers.

The making of this choice is precisely the kind of

operational business decision making that government is not good at and
should avoid.
5.

Finally, the role and importance of individual decision

should not be ignored.

mak~ng

We all need to understand that the massive extent

of federal intervention in the economy -- high levels of taxation,
expenditures, and regulation -- makes it difficult for the private sector
to perform its basic functions.

The major contribution Congress could

make is to reduce the burdens imposed by big government.

